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To date, the issue of  multilateral cooperation between Japan and Central Asian countries has not been 
widely covered by the international academic community. Indeed, the absence of  this particular research 
casts doubt on the existence of  initial publications about the presence of  a full-ﬂedged Japanese foreign 
policy strategy in Central Asia. Nowadays, in a narrow sense, the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue is 
the only dialogue platform between Japan and Central Asia. The dialogue is also a unique example of  how 
Japan and the Central Asian republics cooperate on critical issues of  the regional and international agenda. 
The present article is aimed at evaluating the current role of  the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue 
from the Japanese perspective. The goal is to examine the activities of  the dialogue from 2004 to 2018, 
starting with key stages in the formation of  Japanese strategy towards Central Asia (1991–2018), including 
those that led to the creation of  the dialogue.
Constructivism is the primary theoretical framework used in this thesis, drawing on the sub-theory of  
“conference diplomacy” for a more in-depth analysis of  the dialogue as a communication mechanism. 
The research questions were answered by the author using discourse analysis and desk research of  
relevant documents belonging to the dialogue, including speeches, presentations and outcome documents. 
In addition, the author conducted several interviews with former officials and scholars who directly 
participated in the dialogue’s formation. 
The uniqueness of  the present work lies in the fact that the case of  the “Central Asia plus Japan” 
dialogue has not been considered before in such detail. This study helps reveal the essence of  the dialogue, 
including its principles and modus operandi. The author also could trace the process of  the transformation 
of  the dialogue and its perception from the Japanese perspective. Through this, the author found speciﬁc 
“norms” which guide the multilateral nature of  Central Asia–Japan cooperation.
Keywords:  “Central Asia+Japan” Dialogue, Central Asia, Japanese Diplomacy, Japanese Foreign Policy, Conference 
Diplomacy
Introduction.
Currently, Japan’s foreign policy is undergoing a noticeable upsurge. After 2012, the incumbent Prime 
Minister of  Japan Shinzo Abe has primarily revived the political and academic debate on the further role of  the 
Japanese foreign strategy. Even though Abe mainly focused on Japan’s closest allies and neighbors, including 
the United States (US), China (PRC), Russia, North and South Korea, and Southeast Asia, his efforts led to the 
expansion of  Japanese diplomacy in other essential directions. Central Asia, which is located between Russia 
and the PRC, is not the last in this process. In October 2015, Abe became the ﬁrst Prime Minister in the modern 
history of  Japan, who visited all ﬁve countries of  the region. During his speech at the Nazarbayev University, 
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in Kazakhstan, Abe proclaimed new messages that aimed at further development of  Central Asia–Japan 
cooperation, i.e.: (1) “drastic” strengthening of  relations; (2) Japan’s active involvement in efforts to address 
universal for the region challenges; (3) deepening partnership in the global arena (2015). At the same time, 
speaking about the role of  Japanese initiative–the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue (after this–dialogue)–
Abe pointed out that Tokyo would continue to play the role of  a catalyst in this process. However, it must be 
admitted that the assessment and forecasts regarding the further role of  Japan in the region are impossible 
without a comprehensive analysis of  the current volume of  multilateral cooperation.
The ﬁrst ofﬁcial strategy of  Japan on Central Asia appeared in 1997 under the administration of  Ryutaro 
Hashimoto, who initiated the launch of  so-called Eurasian diplomacy. Moreover, Hashimoto (1997) also dubbed 
the countries of  Central Asia and the Caucasus as the “Silk Road region” and identiﬁed three key pillars of  
Japan’s cooperation with the region, namely: (1) development of  a political dialogue; (2) economic cooperation; 
(3) interaction for peace. Despite the serious differences in assessing the goals and objectives of  the strategy, 
this step helped to consolidate the importance of  the Central Asian effect in Japan’s foreign policy.
The new strategic direction was further developed under the administration of  Junichiro Koizumi, mainly 
thanks to the efforts of  his Foreign Ministers, Yoriko Kawaguchi and Taro Aso; the Minister of  Economy, 
Trade and Industry Akira Amari; and other politicians. During her visit to Central Asia in the summer of  2004, 
Kawaguchi initiated the creation of  the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue, which is still viewed by many 
experts as an important element of  Japanese engagement into regional affairs. In August 2019, this initiative 
will celebrate its ﬁfteenth anniversary, which demonstrates its important role and longevity in the process of  
building Central Asia–Japan partnership. Moreover, a number of  experts (Tanaka, 2018; Kawato, 2018; Starr 
2017) believe that the dialogue had played a unique historical role for Central Asia as a prototype for posterior 
dialogue platforms with the Republic of  Korea (ROK), the European Union (EU), and other international 
partners. Accordingly, the dialogue acts as “knowledge,” which Central Asian countries use today in their 
diplomatic craft.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that many of  the works devoted to the dialogue are related to its 
initial stage. There were signiﬁcant changes in Japanese domestic politics, namely the change of  the ruling 
parties in 2009 and 2012, which to some extent affected Japan’s foreign policy. Despite such peripeteia, the 
dialogue continued to function and produce informative documents that have not been completely studied until 
now. From time to time, independent authors have used fragments of  the dialogue-related activities in their 
publications, which, by-turn, only lead to a limited and sometimes subjective evaluation of  the process. 
With this article, the author intends to demonstrate an important facet of  Japan’s relations with Central 
Asia, i.e. to reveal the essence of  Tokyo’s multilateral approach. In fact, the author scrutinizes the content of  
the multilateral cooperation between Japan and Central Asia and already existing outcomes. As a result, the 
author attempts to assess activities and transformation of  the dialogue since its inception in 2004. Based on 
Kaufman’s “Conference diplomacy” (1996), the author has attempted to understand the structural changes in 
the framework of  the dialogue and relate it to relevant domestic and international events, while clearly deﬁning 
the principles, norms, and identities that determine and inﬂuence Japan’s multilateral stance on Central Asia. 
The study is built on the following research questions: 1) What lies behind the idea of  creating a dialogue? 2) 
What is the role of  the dialogue in the Japanese foreign policy? 3) What are the unique features of  the dialogue? 
Is the dialogue a capable platform for communication between Japan and the region? 
Further, after reviewing all previously published documents about the dialogue, the author analyses the 
formation and launch of  the dialogue, based on multilateral cooperation between Japan and Central Asia. Next, 
comes a detailed overview of  dialogue’s structure and its content. After receiving speciﬁc empirical data, the 
author proceeds to an analysis of  the dialogue and its strengths and weaknesses.
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1. Theoretical framework and literature review
At present, there are many academic and analytical publications devoted to political, economic, military and 
even ideological aspects of  Japan’s foreign policy. Thanks to the efforts of  individual authors, Central Asia 
occupies its unique place in the study of  Japanese diplomacy and its basic approaches and values. The main 
ﬂow of  these publications related to the perception of  the Central Asian vector through the prism of  Japan’s 
relations with Russia, the PRC, the US and the EU. In this context, the reader can imagine the role of  Central 
Asia in Japan’s foreign policy strategy, as well as learn about further cooperation opportunities. Thanks to 
such authors as Dadabaev (2014, 2016), Kawato (2008), Komatsu (2004), Len (2008), Uyama (2008), Tsunozaki 
(2007), Yuasa (2007, 2008), and others, readers can become well informed about Japanese political and economic 
interests in the Central Asian region and familiarize themselves with those unique strategies and methods that 
Tokyo employs to achieve its goals in Central Asia.
Almost all authors stressed the role of  the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue, which was created three years 
after the 9/11 events. At the same time, the analysis of  these publications shows that the detailed assessment of  
the dialogue’s activities was carried out only at the initial stage of  the forum’s creation. The authors were most 
interested in the transformation of  Japanese foreign policy in Central Asia in the early 2000s, as well as the 
choice of  the current form of  the dialogue. Such authors also make frequent comparisons between the dialogue 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, unfortunately, do not consider such critical criteria as 
their legal status, membership, founding documents, and organizational structure.
Yuasa (2007) indicates in his work several unique factors that significantly contributed to the formation 
of  the dialogue’s ideas through early attempts of  the Hashimoto administration to develop a multilateral 
approach towards Central Asia. Former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Kawato (2008), also contributed 
to the description of  the dialogue’s creation based on his memories. In addition, he identiﬁed several important 
factors, e.g. the lack of  support from the side of  the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Diet, which 
resulted in the dialogue’s low proﬁle. Contrariwise, the former Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Toshio 
Tsunozaki (2007), gives an exceptionally positive impression of  his participation in the launch of  the dialogue. 
Another author, Len (2008), identiﬁed a year of  dialogue’s establishment as a starting point for a new period in 
Central Asia-Japan relationship. At the same time, Len raises critical issues in front of  readers that can indicate 
the dialogue’s possible politicization and its deliberate inefﬁciency. On the other hand, Uyama (2008) highlights 
the importance of  the dialogue and the non-confrontational efforts of  the Government of  Japan towards Central 
Asia. Dadabaev (2014) also pays considerable attention to the process of  the dialogue’s formation. He is one 
of  those rare authors, who argue about the direct link between the dialogue and other multilateral dialogue 
mechanisms in Japanese diplomatic practice. However, he avoided detailed comparison or in-depth study 
of  such platforms. In his other work, on the foreign policy of  the Central Asian countries, Dadabaev (2016) 
provides a detailed analysis of  numerous strategies and initiatives that Japan successfully use in the region. 
Curiously, this time the author mentions the dialogue less frequently; brieﬂy covering it during the comparison 
of  China/Japan foreign policy approaches and Japanese assessments of  possible water-related inter-action in 
Central Asia. Among young researchers, who showed great interest in this initiative, it is worth to mention the 
doctoral thesis of  Mahmudov (2017) that covers the dialogue analysis in a broader sense, based on interviews 
with direct participants of  the dialogue meetings. At the same time, the author takes a critical stance on the 
dialogue’s expediency.
The use of  constructivism as a theoretical framework makes it possible to reveal behavior, beliefs, practices 
and values of  Japan and the Central Asian nations in the framework of  a specific initiative with high 
geopolitical contour. Therefore, the academic community obtain additional data on the identities of  Japan 
and the Central Asian countries, as well as norms that identify their behavior in the framework of  a joint 
multilateral platform. 
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During the interviews with numerous participants of  the dialogue’s creation, including Kawaguchi, Tanaka, 
Kawato and others, the Japanese speakers repeatedly noted that the idea of  the dialogue was built on the basis 
of  Japan’s fruitful cooperation with the Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a model close to 
ASEAN Plus Three (after this–APT) format. The author was also interested to know how Japanese experts see 
the Japanese role in the framework of  the APT and Japan’s relations with the Association.
A concept of  the conference diplomacy regime for ASEAN was ﬁrst proposed in 2003 by the Japanese author 
Sato in his book, “The ASEAN Regime: Development and Challenges of  the ASEAN Foreign Policies.” Other 
scholars of  ASEAN–Japan relations also supported this approach. This new approach, based on the original 
idea of  “conference diplomacy” (Kaufman, 1996) and its posterior applications, was applied for Central Asia–
Japan studies for the ﬁrst time. To avoid inaccuracies during the research process, the author relied exclusively 
on original Japanese documents, using English and Russian texts for comparison only. The author also used the 
opportunities provided by the Foreign Ministry of  Japan (MOFA) to participate in the meetings of  the Tokyo 
Intellectual Dialogue (TID) and Working Group (WGM) in 2018.
2. The way to the dialogueʼs creation
Twenty-eight years have passed since Japan recognized the independence of  the Central Asian countries. 
During this period, the countries of  the region and Japan were able to establish close relations and create 
various mechanisms of  bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue is the ﬁrst 
and so far the only instrument of  their multilateral cooperation in a narrow format.
The author believes that the prerequisites for the formation of  this tool appeared long before its actual 
emergence, and that it marched in step to the development of  Japan’s bilateral relations with Central Asia. As 
it turned out, prior to 2004, Japan had initiated large-scale international conferences that were directly related to 
different challenges for Central Asia’s sustainable development.
In October 1992, Japan organized the Tokyo Conference on Assistance to the New(ly) Independent States, 
which brought together representatives of  70 countries and 20 international/regional organizations (IO/
ROs). This meeting was held eight months after a similar conference in the United States. As a result of  these 
meetings, Japan began to provide technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and to promote economic relations 
with the countries of  the former USSR on the “help for self-help” basis (Miyazawa, 1992). In September 1999, 
two years after the launch of  the Eurasian Diplomacy, Japan organized the Tokyo International Conference 
on Semipalatinsk, which brought together representatives of  24 countries and 12 IOs, and was designed to 
help Kazakhstan in its efforts to deal with the consequences of  nuclear testing on the territory of  former 
Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, located in eastern part of  Kazakhstan. In January 2002, one of  the first 
for Japanese conferences on Afghan issues–The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan–was hosted by Tokyo.
In 1999, a group of  well-known Japanese scholars submitted the report “Challenge 2001–Japan’s Foreign 
Policy Toward the 21st Century” to the leadership of  the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This report highlighted 
the importance of  strengthening the mechanisms of  diplomatic frameworks, including the creation of  new 
frameworks for building a safe and prosperous world.
In 2002, the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations recommended the Japanese Government 
include Central Asia and the Caspian Sea countries in the priority list of  it’s Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in order to support projects aimed at the regional integration. The task force also pointed out 
the importance of  pursuing Japan’s foreign policy in accordance with national interests based on such notions 
as: (1) the maintenance of  the peace and security of  Japan; (2) the maintenance of  the free trade system; (3) 
protection of  democratic values; (4) people-to-people exchanges and (5) the development of  human resources.
Until 2004 before the dialogue was actually established, the Japanese Government initiated numerous 
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diplomatic frameworks for various organizations and countries, including the EU (1991), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) (1993), the Central American states (1995), the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) (1996), ASEAN (1997), China and the ROK (1999), the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) (2000), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (2000), countries of  the Islamic world (2002), 
the Andean Community (2002), and Arab States (2003).
The presence of  such a colorful set of  frameworks suggests that Japan had a substantial experience of  
interacting with these groups in a more extended format. The choice of  dialogue partners was determined 
by the political (e.g., NATO, OSCE) and economic interests (e.g., MERCOSUR, CARICOM) of  Japan. Moreover, 
given the fact that Japan has observer status among a large number of  IOs and ROs, these frameworks allowing 
Tokyo to monitor and analyze speciﬁc developments in various parts of  the world. An analysis of  the internal 
content of  these mechanisms suggests that Japan does not have the “one-size-ﬁts-all” model that Tokyo applies 
to its partners. It indicates that Japan is ﬂexible in this matter, although this can also be dictated by the speciﬁc 
interests of  Japan and possible restrictions for external partners. For example, in 1981, Japan and ASEAN 
established a new international organization in Tokyo–the ASEAN Promotion Center for Trade, Investment and 
Tourism (ASEAN–Japan Center) –in order to jointly solve different economic issues. In 2011, Japan, China, and 
the ROK launched the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul (South Korea).
According to Kawato (2008; 2018), the dialogue’s idea was ﬁrst presented during a joint meeting of  Japanese 
Ambassadors accredited in Central Asia and the leadership of  the MOFA’s European Bureau in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan in September 2003. Tsunozaki, the Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, and Kenji Shinoda, then 
Deputy Director General of  the European Bureau, presented this idea together. At that time, Japanese Foreign 
Ministry ofﬁcials considered several options that included the possible participation of  Japan in the activities 
of  the SCO or the Organization of  Central Asian Cooperation (CACO). The ﬁrst option was unlikely due to the 
absence of  other Western powers in the SCO. In 2004, during the CACO business forum in the city of  Almaty, 
in Kazakhstan, Tsunozaki announced Japanese interest in establishing direct contact and cooperation programs 
with the CACO, i.e. in water, energy and transport sectors. However, this option lost its attractiveness after 
Russia’s accession to the CACO in the same year. Finally, the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue on the APT 
model turned out to be the most acceptable solution for Japan. Apparently, the launch of  a new initiative could 
not take place at all, which again indicates the uniqueness of  the decision made by Japan.
Yuasa (2008) indicates that the process of  the dialogue’s formation was connected with numerous messages 
from the so-called “epistemic community,” especially academic circles, as well as representatives of  the Central 
Asian countries to create an interactive platform for Central Asia–Japan communication. In March 2003, the 
Japan Institute of  International Affairs (JIIA) published a report, “Development of  New State of  Affairs in 
Central Asia.” In the document, Japanese scholars mentioned the necessity in a new strategy for Central Asia, 
e.g. during a possible visit of  the Prime Minister of  Japan to Central Asia. According to Sudo (1998), who is a 
prominent scholar on ASEAN–Japan relations, the Fukuda doctrine, which was indicated in the aforementioned 
report as a model concept, in fact, was “the ﬁrst Japanese policy initiative that identiﬁed ASEAN as the most 
important direction (of  its foreign policy).” 
Yuasa also notes that the Foreign Ministry ofﬁcials played the central role in this process. However, the chief  
author of  the dialogue idea, former Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi (2017) pointed out that the original 
idea was born after her meeting with Tetsuji Tanaka in the summer of  2003. As a result of  their meeting, the 
question arose about the appropriate form of  new Central Asia–Japan cooperation dialogue. As a result, the 
MOFA staff  was responsible for the practical implementation of  the new task. 
Kawaguchi’s choice in favour of  Tanaka as a main interlocutor for discussing the Central Asian theme was 
surprising. However, this step could be related to Tanaka’s professional background, i.e. his former afﬁliation 
to the Bank of  Japan and his personal contacts with the Central Asian government ofﬁcials as their personal 
advisor. Before taking up the post of  the foreign minister, Kawaguchi had extensive working experience in the 
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Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of  Economy, Trade and Industry), the World 
Bank, and the private sector. During the interviews, Kawaguchi and Tanaka focused mostly on economic issues 
that led to the dialogue’s creation. Tanaka (2018) also designated Kawaguchi’s work history as an essential 
element in the dialogue’s success at the initial stage. Kawaguchi also noted that the dialogue’s formation was 
lean on two notions, i.e. regional cooperation and economic development. Such emphasis was related to the 
desire to promote the development of  projects that would advance intra-regional cooperation and economic 
prosperity of  the region. In this connection, the author is convinced that the “economic” factor was one of  the 
main pillars behind the dialogue’s creation.
According to Kawato (2008; 2018), the final idea was first presented to the Uzbek Foreign Minister Sodiq 
Safoyev during his visit to Japan in December 2003. After that, Japanese plans was also discussed with 
representatives of  other Central Asian countries. In March 2004, the MOFA hosted a symposium, “The Current 
State and Future of  Regional Cooperation in Central Asia.” During the event, Parliamentary Vice Minister Isao 
Matsumiya stressed the importance of  reviewing the Japanese strategy in Central Asia. He also hinted about 
the formation of  a new strategic approach towards Central Asia.
According to Kawaguchi, the timing of  the meeting was chosen as a result of  her informal conversation 
with the then Foreign Minister of  Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the Asian Cooperation Dialogue’s 
(ACD) meeting in China in 2004. Tokayev proposed to organize the meeting around the time of  the CACO 
Foreign Ministers’ gathering in Astana in August 2004. Tokayev also promised Kawaguchi to discuss the date 
with his Central Asian colleagues. Dadabaev notes (2016:22) that Japan has decided to present the initiative in 
Uzbekistan before the ﬁrst ofﬁcial meeting in Astana, taking into account the competition between Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan for regional dominance. These facts also indicate that the Japanese side treats their reputation 
and attitude towards the Central Asian countries very carefully.
During her visit to Uzbekistan in 2004, Kawaguchi issued a statement on the Japanese strategy in Central 
Asia at the University of  World Economy and Diplomacy. She highlighted the importance of  the Central 
Asian region for global security, as well as lack of  “selﬁsh goals” in Japanese attitude to Central Asia. Since 
the adoption of  Eurasian diplomacy, Japan and the Central Asian countries have been able to demonstrate 
signiﬁcant changes in the nature and scope of  their cooperation and in their level of  cultural understanding. As 
was mentioned by Mme. Kawaguchi, Japan is a “natural partner” for Central Asia. 
In addition, Kawaguchi noted significant prospects for collaboration in the field of  social and economic 
cooperation, including in the area of  human resources development, energy, environment, etc. As a result, 
Kawaguchi proposed the creation of  a dialogue as a “new dimension” and an “option for cooperation” based 
on principles such as “respecting diversity, competition, and coordination, and open cooperation.” The author’s 
analysis of  bilateral mechanisms shows that in 2004 not all countries had a current set of  bilateral dialogue 
mechanisms like the Parliamentary Friendship League or the Joint Economic Cooperation Commission. At that 
time, these facts gave the dialogue a deeper meaning in the eyes of  the Central Asian politicians and diplomats.
The emphasis in Kawaguchi’s speech was focused on the development of  intra-regional economic integration 
in Central Asia on the ASEAN-based experience. Thus, Japan demonstrated its interest in maintaining the 
principles of  intra-regional cooperation close to the CACO spirit, as well as their perception of  Central Asia 
as an integral region. In addition, Kawaguchi expressed hopes that one day Afghanistan could also join the 
process.
The ﬁrst ofﬁcial meeting of  Central Asia–Japan foreign ministers (ﬁrst FMM) was held on August 28, 2004 
in Astana. However, the Turkmenistan delegation was presented at the level of  Ambassador. Later, it becomes 
clear that Japan would negatively react on the low level of  Central Asian participation. Nevertheless, according 
to the former Director General of  the European Bureau Komatsu (2004), participation of  the Turkmen side was 
considered as demonstration of  support to the initiative. 
Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan Tsunozaki (2007) notes in his memoirs that all participants of  the ﬁrst 
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meeting welcomed the initiative. One of  the main outcomes of  the meeting was determination of  the forum’s 
goals in such dimensions as security, democratic development, socio-economic growth, and close cooperation in 
addressing regional and global issues.
The review of  Central Asia–Japan membership in various IO/ROs prior to 2004 shows that the opportunities 
for their multilateral cooperation were noticeably limited. For example, some countries were less presented in 
various organizations such as the ACD, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). These facts could also indicate a desire of  the Japanese side to promote Central Asia–
Japan multilateral contacts and projects in a more systematic way.
In December 2004, Kawaguchi, as the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of  Japan, took part in the twelfth 
Ministerial Council (MC) of  the OSCE in Soﬁa, Bulgaria. An additional meeting among the representatives of  
Japan and the Central Asian countries was held on the MC margins to discuss the working moments of  the ﬁrst 
FMM. This meeting was also the ﬁrst and only meeting among the dialogue participants in the framework of  
major international forums.
During her speech at the OSCE event, Kawaguchi presented the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue and 
urged her European colleagues to jointly assist Central Asian efforts in such ﬁelds as combating international 
terrorism, drug trafﬁcking, water issues, environmental problems, development of  transport communications, 
and energy. This message could be also linked with previous Japan–OSCE experience, including based on their 
joint conference “Comprehensive Security in Central Asia–Sharing OSCE and Asian Experiences,” which was 
held in Tokyo in December 2000. It is noteworthy that two years after the launch of  the dialogue, in April 2006, 
the ﬁfteenth Japan–EU Summit led to the launch of  a separate dialogue on Central Asia, based on a similar 
Japan–EU framework vis-à-vis the East Asia region. In addition, Kawaguchi (2018) mentioned that she also 
made a similar appeal during her working meetings with representatives of  the U.S. Department of  State. This 
approach also mirrors the ideas of  Ambassador Kawato, who, during the process of  the dialogue’s creation, 
believed that Japan could initiate the creation of  a multilateral platform in Central Asia close to the example of  
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
One notable feature of  this period was the lack of  proper attention among Japanese media to the outcome 
of  the first FMM. Analysis of  publications and interviews relates it to the fact that Kawaguchi refused to 
use such a traditional tool for Japanese diplomacy as the “chequebook diplomacy” during her trip to Central 
Asia. Nevertheless, Tanaka, Kawato, and others (2018), who wished to remain anonymous, pointed out that the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry was impressed by the overestimation of  the results of  Kawaguchi’s visit by Russian 
and Chinese media.
3. Transformation of the dialogue
During the fourteen years of  its existence, the dialogue was able both to achieve signiﬁcant results and miss 
several unique opportunities for its further development. In order to understand this process more precisely, the 
author has divided it into several stages, selecting FMMs as the starting point of  each stage.
(1) Step one
According to Figure 1, the first structural elements of  the dialogue appeared in the interval between the 
first and second ministerial meetings. They include the meetings of  Senior Officials (SOM) and the Tokyo 
Intellectual Dialogue (TID). The intermediate meeting that was held in Bulgaria in 2004, after the ﬁrst FMM, is 
not included in the timeframe due to the low level of  reference to it.
According to the Diplomatic Bluebook of  the Japanese Foreign Ministry (2006:101), the ﬁrst SOM was held in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2005. At that event, the participants agreed on the main areas of  cooperation, namely: 
(1) politics; (2) intra-regional issues (counterterrorism, drugs, mines, poverty eradication, medical assistance 
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and healthcare, environment, water, energy, trade and investment, transportation); (3) business promotion; (4) 
intellectual dialogue; and (5) socio-cultural exchanges. The ﬁrst meeting of  the TID was held in Tokyo in 2006 
with support from the Nippon Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), an organization that also helped 
the government to host the Japan-OSCE Conference in 2000. At the ﬁrst TID, it was suggested that the Track II 
meetings should be held once a year. 
The meeting made it possible to identify new areas for multilateral cooperation, e.g. cross-border 
infrastructure and tourism. In addition, the participants were able to discover initial limitations in the dialogue’s 
activities. According to Akiko Fukushima (2006), the ﬁrst TID was focused on the importance of  systematic and 
realistic cooperation, i.e. based on the limited participation of  the Central Asian states in promising projects. In 
2007, during the second TID, participants also highlighted the importance of  in-depth discussions of  regional 
problems and possible projects with pronounced regional effect.
In order to strengthen economic cooperation, it was also proposed to establish a Joint Committee on business 
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 (28.09.2016, JP)
10 TID
 (31.03.2017, JP)
1 BD
(28.02.2017, JP)
2 WGM 
(19.12.2014, JP)
3 WGM 
(04.02.2016, JP)
FMEP
(13-20.11.2014, JP)
FMEP
(21-28.01.2016, JP)
12 SOM 
(26.01.2018, TJ)
13 SOM 
(26.11.2018, JP)
11 TID
(03.07.2018, JP)
2 BD
(23.03.2018, JP)
4 WGM
(20.02.2018, JP)
(Note: FMM–Foreign Ministers Meeting, SOM–Senior Ofﬁcials Meeting,
TID–Tokyo Intellectual Dialogue, EF–Economic Forum, WGM–Working Group Meeting,
FMEP–Foreign Ministries’ Exchange Program, BD–Business Dialogue;
KZ–Kazakhstan, UZ–Uzbekistan, TJ–Tajikistan, KG–Kyrgyzstan, TM–Turkmenistan, JP–Japan).
Figure 1. Timeline of  the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue-related events
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matters between Japan and Central Asia under the aegis of  the dialogue. Moreover, the Senior Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of  Japan Yasuhisa Shiozaki used the term “catalyst” for the ﬁrst time to describe the Japanese 
role in the dialogue. This fact demonstrates the transformation of  Japan’s role from being the “natural (equal) 
partner” (Kawaguchi) to being a catalyst (Shiozaki), which is closer to such concepts as “intermediary” or 
“conductor”.
(2) Step two
The second FMM was held in June 2006 in Tokyo. This meeting became significant due to a detailed 
discussion of  the further role of  the dialogue. 
First, the foreign minister of  Afghanistan attended the meeting for the ﬁrst time as a guest/observer. This 
has been the case when the ofﬁcial representative of  a third country participated in the dialogue. In addition, 
in the 2007 Diplomatic Bluebook, the possibility of  the dialogue expansion at the expense of  Afghanistan and 
Pakistan was noted. As we can see later, the Afghan issue would be raised regularly in agendas and outcome 
documents of  the subsequent meetings.
Next, following the second FMM, a comprehensive Action plan was adopted, and it determined the main 
direction of  the dialogue activities. Despite the absence of  a well-deﬁned timeframe, the action plan continues 
to be one of  the most signiﬁcant documents of  the dialogue. It covers ﬁve basic tenets of  the dialogue and ten 
most promising areas of  cooperation that were agreed during the first SOM. Despite the several important 
for Japan-Central Asia cooperation dates, e.g. the tenth anniversary of  the dialogue (2014), the twentieth 
anniversary and the twenty-ﬁfth anniversaries of  the establishment of  Central Asia–Japan diplomatic relations 
(2012 and 2017), the dialogue participants missed these unique opportunities to strengthen the basic principles 
and goals of  the dialogue.
In addition, the second meeting gave signiﬁcant impetus to the institutionalization of  the dialogue. However, 
many of  these achievements remain on paper only. For example, the Action Plan includes an appeal to consider 
the possibility of  holding the ﬁrst Summit. Traces of  this issue can be found later, in the 2009 parliamentary 
statements of  the Japanese Foreign Ministry ofﬁcials, but most of  them merely conﬁrm Tokyo’s interest in this 
speciﬁc event. During the interviews, many of  speakers excluded the possibility of  holding such a meeting 
under the current geopolitical conditions.
Participants have also proposed the establishment of  a Working Group on Economics (WGM) to study 
regional projects and the participation of  public and private institutions. It could be said that the WGM has 
become the counterpoint solution to the previous ideas on a joint economic structure within the dialogue. 
However, it is evident that the WGM could not advocate for the development and implementation of  high-
profile economic projects due to limited status of  the Group as a structural unit. Moreover, the first WGM 
was organized in 2014, and up to this day only four meetings have been held. The Action Plan supported the 
proposal to hold annual meetings of  the TID.
Finally, this meeting shed light on an updated vision of  Japanese diplomacy in Central Asia, following 
statements by Hashimoto (1997), Koizumi (2002) and Kawaguchi (2004). On the eve of  the second FMM, Aso 
gave an extraordinary speech on Japanese policy in the region. Aso designated Central Asia as the object of  the 
“New Great Game,” which, by-turn, gave Kawaguchi’s initiative a robust political connotation and increased 
the doubts of  Russian and Chinese media about Tokyo’s real intentions. Aso also updated the basic concepts in 
describing the importance of  Central Asia to Japan: leaving security, economic potential and the development 
of  multilateral relations, and breaking them with an “afﬁnity” (interest to Japan). Moreover, he updated the 
guidelines of  the Japanese diplomacy in the region, incorporating: (1) a broad-based perspective; (2) regional 
cooperation; and (3) partnerships based on common universal values.
Five months later at the JIIA event, Aso presented his vision of  so-called “Arc of  Freedom and Prosperity” 
for the Eurasian continent. The message also called for closer cooperation with NATO on the Afghan issue. At 
the same time, the Arc’s key countries, including the countries of  Central Asia, were presented as “marathon 
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runners” and Japan was depicted as an “escort runner,” which can also be compared with the attempt of  Aso 
to give a new meaning to the concept of  “catalyst.”
(3) Step three
The third FMM was held in 2010 in Uzbekistan during the reign of  the Democratic Party of  Japan (DPJ). 
Despite the plain results of  the ministerial meeting, including adoption of  a Joint Press release–a low-level 
political document–Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada was able to achieve some progress. For example, 
according to data from Okada’s personal blog (2010), he returned to the issue of  having regularly scheduled 
ministerial meetings, and as a result, participants agreed to hold follow-up ministerial meetings in Japan and 
Kyrgyzstan two and four years later, respectively. It was also suggested that SOMs should be held at least once 
a year.
According to Kitagawa Katsuro (2010), who was the Head of  Central Asia and the Caucasus Division at 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry at that time, this meeting was an important for the DPJ to prove their desire for 
friendly relations with Central Asia. Same time, he expressed disappointment that Turkmenistan was presented 
at the level of  Ambassador. The author also used this instrument–participation criterion–to improve the 
analysis of  the dialogue’s events.
The third FMM was also preceded by the fourth TID (2010), during which DPJ representative returned 
to the notion of  “catalyst.” At the same time, they were able to enforce the catalyst’s meaning by inviting 
representatives from the Asian Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
to a meeting. In 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura spoke about the importance of  ADB and 
other international ﬁnancial institution’s participation in the dialogue. However, neither he nor his successors 
from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) followed up on this important suggestion. The DPJ was able to 
go further, proposing to hold the first “Economic Forum” in Japan, which, in fact, continued to function as 
Business dialogues and helped to enhance the WGM activities.
In addition, under Okada, the ﬁrst and only review of  national reports on the implementation of  the Action 
plan was made. The dialogue participants no longer use this method. This fact demonstrates the absence of  
mechanisms for monitoring the process of  implementation of  multilateral agreements.
(4) Step four
The fourth FMM took place in 2012 in Japan. It coincided with the twentieth anniversary of  the establishment 
of  diplomatic relations between Japan and the Central Asian nations. The peculiarity of  this meeting was 
related with the full-ﬂedged participation of  the delegation of  Turkmenistan in the event. 
In addition, all parties agreed to include the Foreign Ministries’ Exchange Program in the dialogue activities. 
In fact, this initiative was based on the previously existent exchange program established by the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry for young diplomats from the Newly Independent States. Meeting participants also stressed 
the importance of  inviting new guests to participate in the dialogue meetings, such as representatives of  the UN 
agencies. Moreover, the participants supported the proposal of  the Kyrgyz side to create a dialogue’s website: 
http://www.ca-jp.org/index.php/ja/ (out-of-operation). 
The main result of  this phase was the launching of  multilateral consultations on cooperation in the ﬁeld of  
agriculture. The sixth TID and the ﬁrst WGM were devoted to this topic. At the same time, the Japanese side 
indicated a new criteria–“Japanese speciﬁcity”–for projects to be discussed in the framework of  the dialogue. 
Analysis of  the statements shows that the Japanese side understands under this term those projects that are 
“based on or aimed at the transfer/acquisition of  Japanese technologies and expertise.”
(5) Step ﬁve
The ﬁfth FMM was held in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Then, for the ﬁrst time in the history of  the dialogue, all 
members were represented at the ministerial level. It had taken ten years for Japan and the Central Asian 
countries to give the dialogue a ﬁnished look. 
Nevertheless, the parties reﬂected the importance of  “new decade” in the work of  the dialogue and giving it 
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practical content. As evidence, the participants adopted the ﬁrst in the framework of  the dialogue Roadmap on 
agriculture (e.g., ﬁght against pests, silkworm breeding, livestock, and processing of  fruits and vegetables). It 
is noteworthy that one year later, in 2015, the Ministry of  Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) adopted 
a new strategy titled, “The Global Food Value Chain Strategy: Promote “Made with Japan” through Public-
Private Partnership,” which supports ideas to create regional food supply chains in Central Asia and Russia.
In addition, this phase was further stimulated by the visit of  Japanese Prime Minister Abe to Central Asia 
in October 2015. Undoubtedly, the visit had tremendous value for the further development of  Japanese foreign 
policy towards Central Asia and vice-versa. Many of  Step five events were devoted to the implementation 
of  results of  the visit. In addition, creation of  a new instrument of  Kantei diplomacy–Japan-Russia-Central 
Asia Exchange Promotion Council, whose ﬁrst meeting was held on November 9, 2015 can also serve as clear 
evidence of  this fact.
Another important result of  this phase was the seventh TID. During the event, representatives of  the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry introduced the dialogue as a “public good” that contributing to the stability and 
development of  Central Asia. Moreover, the President of  the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
made his first appearance at the dialogue’s event. In his speech, Akihiko Tanaka pointed out that the JICA 
has long been using the dialogue meetings as a basis for its activities in the region. Same time, he pointed out 
the small number of  regional projects in the Agency’s portfolio. Tanaka also referred to the challenges and 
opportunities faced by the region and particular points for Central Asia to focus on: (1) challenges: sanctions 
against Russia over the situation in Ukraine; incursions by the ISIL; withdrawal of  the ISAF from Afghanistan; 
(2) needs: employment opportunities; diversiﬁcation of  industries in non-resources areas; ﬁnancial support and 
private sector investment; improvement of  deteriorated infrastructure; achievement of  SDGs; (3) opportunities: 
CAREC Program, SCO, and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
Apparently, for the Japanese Agency, it seemed more sensible and effective to use the existing mechanisms 
in the region to support projects and initiatives. Given China’s role in CAREC and the SCO, and Russia’s role 
in the EEU, it can be assumed that JICA is clearly realize the possibility of  cooperation with both PRC and 
Russia, rather than in competition with them. Besides, Tanaka pointed out the three tasks to be implemented: 
(1) intra-regional and extra-regional cooperative relationships as an open region; (2) increasing connectivity with 
neighboring countries and developing domestic systems; (3) equal distribution of  economic growth universally 
to the people by strengthening the capacity of  the public sector.
(6) Step six
The sixth FMM and last meeting for today was held in May 2017, in Turkmenistan. Foreign Minister Fumio 
Kishida became the ﬁrst head of  the Japanese Foreign Ofﬁce, who visited the region twice and took part in two 
ministerial meetings. Following the outcome of  the sixth FMM, parties adopted a new regional cooperation 
Roadmap, on Transport and Logistics.
Kishida also came out with the “Initiative for Cooperation in Transport and Logistics” that would be 
supported by the additional assistance of  the Japanese Government to the region worth 24 billion yen. This sum 
could be considered as the ﬁrst form of  ﬁnancial assistance, to be given to the region in the framework of  the 
dialogue. Indeed, it also could mean that Japan ﬁnally decided to employ the “chequebook diplomacy” in order 
to give its initiative the “practical” nature.
Moreover, based on the outcome of  the eleventh TID, which was held under the title, “Regional Cooperation 
in Central Asia and Strategic Outlook for Regional Security,” it might be assumed that Japanese scholars and 
ofﬁcials are interested in the discussion of  Central Asian–Japan cooperation for reconstruction of  and peace 
building in Afghanistan. 
Speaking about the last two phases, it could be observed that the dialogue members started to “consistently” 
study the “practical” forms of  intra-regional cooperation in agriculture, transport and logistics, and recently 
in the ﬁeld of  tourism, which was chosen as another promising area of  cooperation during the last dialogue 
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meetings.
(7) Step seven
The next FMM would be held in Tajikistan for the ﬁrst time. On the one hand, this once again demonstrates 
Japan’s readiness to negotiate with its Central Asian partners in their domain. At the same time, it is not clear 
what exactly a new Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono could bring to the dialogue.
4. Analysis and discussion
(1) Structural features of  the Dialogue
1. To date, FMM is the highest possible level for meetings in the framework of  the dialogue. The analysis 
of  the dialogue’s activities shows that the primary documents are usually adopted at the ministerial meetings. 
In this regard, it can be argued that the FMM is the chief  political body of  the forum that responsible for the 
adoption of  political decisions, outcome documents and the approval of  new initiatives. The dialogue has no 
any clear schedule for the ministerial meetings. Same time, it can be assumed that participants still try to adhere 
to a particular algorithm, i.e. to meet once every two years (third FMM). However, as was learned earlier, the 
dialogue’s calendar is strongly affected by large-scale domestic and international events, e.g. general elections 
and cabinet reshufﬂes in Japan. Moreover, as was mentioned above, the ﬁrst full-ﬂedged meeting of  the FMM 
with the participation of  all Central Asian delegations took place only in 2012 (fourth FMM), and at the foreign 
ministers’ level two years later, in 2014 (ﬁfth FMM). 
Moreover, all meetings are traditionally held in Japan or Central Asia, but not on the margins of  international 
forums. As a result, the Central Asian countries receive two significant benefits. First, unlike international 
events, they have enough time to discuss their own agenda in the framework of  the dialogue. Secondly, the 
Central Asian countries form a regular basis for the organization of  visits by Japanese Foreign Minister to the 
region.
It also seems unusual that a representative of  only one nation, namely Afghanistan, took part in the FMM 
as a guest (second FMM). Despite the existing recommendations (fourth FMM), there is an evident absence of  
representatives of  IO/ROs and ﬁnancial institutions, which also indicates the desire of  the parties to give the 
dialogue an “exclusive” format of  Central Asia–Japan communications. This could be considered as a desire of  
the Central Asian countries to increase ﬁnancial and technical assistance from Japan.
2. In general, the SOM is the most regular and “closed” event in the framework of  the dialogue. It is clear that 
SOMs are important elements in the preparation of  the FMMs and in their “follow-up.” Also, SOMs became 
an important mechanism in maintaining the dialogue’s activities during the absence of  ministerial meetings in 
2007–9. Moreover, following the sixth FMM results, SOMs were also given additional functions to monitor joint 
projects between Japan and Central Asia in the framework of  the dialogue. Based on this fact, the SOM could 
(Note: *–declined proposals or non-functional mechanisms)
Figure 2. Organizational chart of  the dialogue
13
Almas DISSYUKOV, “Central Asia Plus Japan” Dialogue
be considered as the principal executive body of  the dialogue. At the same time, a particular disbalance might 
be seen in the SOM’s composition. For example, in comparison with other delegations that usually presented 
at the level of  Deputy Foreign Minister, the Kazakh side is more often represented at the level of  the Director 
of  Department or the Embassy staff  (seven times). These facts demonstrate key features of  how Central 
Asian countries assess the dialogue by themselves. It is enough just to compare the levels of  participation of  
Kazakhstani delegations in similar structures with the EU, the US and the ROK.
3. It should be noted that Track II approach was strongly recommended to the leadership of  the Foreign 
Ministry of  Japan by the authors of  “Challenge 2001.” During a telephone interview, Hakamada, one of  the 
report authors, noted that the interest of  the Japanese academia and mass media to Central Asia is shallow. And 
regular meetings in the TID format are very complex (from the organizational point of  view), but, in fact, they 
allow exchange information and develop new cooperation ideas. 
In general, TID records usually passed to the FMMs and SOMs in the form of  the Chair summaries. It is 
evident that experts in their assessments count on the fact that these proposals could be admitted based on their 
feasibility and acceptability. 
Today, TID is one of  the unique structures that hold regular meetings and produce various cooperation 
proposals. Same time, the author did not discover any information about the TID meetings in Central Asia. In 
addition, a limited number of  experts from Central Asia participate in each meeting. In this regard, it could be 
concluded that the TID serves exclusively for Japan’s own purposes. The Track II of  “Central Asia plus Japan” 
dialogue could be considered as a platform with a limited effect.
4. WGMs are held in the same manner as TIDs. At the same time, we should understand that WGM-related 
topics usually do not correspond to the primary competence of  the foreign ministries of  Central Asia and 
Japan. It is obvious that discussions and preliminary arrangements on different possible projects, especially in 
the framework of  TIDs, SOMs and FMMs, require additional coordination with the specialized agencies. It is 
obvious that the creation of  a full-ﬂedged economic body could signiﬁcantly increase the effectiveness of  the 
dialogue.
In this context, it should be noted that initial proposals on the establishment of  the Business Council and the 
Joint Economic Committee were not implemented. Consequently, appropriate economic and business institutions 
did not support these ideas due to the possible overlapping of  already existed frameworks. In this regard, 
WGMs could be considered as the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s “invention” to keep economic track in the 
context of  the dialogue.
5. In September 2014, the Second Regional Ministerial Conference of  the Central Asian Disaster Management 
Authorities under the auspice of  the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. As a 
result, participants agreed to regularly convene such meetings at the level of  heads of  the disaster management 
authorities for discussing regional cooperation. However, this event is not reﬂected in an “ofﬁcial” list of  the 
dialogue’s events. Therefore, it can be assumed that the dialogue started to use its name as a “banner” for 
regional events with the participation of  the Japanese and Central Asian ofﬁcials.
6. In July 2014, on the tenth anniversary of  the dialogue, the MOFA Japan presented an unofﬁcial mascot of  
the dialogue, which usually used during PR activities and cultural events in the framework of  the initiative. 
The famous Japanese manga artist Kaoru Mori based on her romance manga books, “A Bride’s Story 
(Otoyomegatari),” compiled the “image” of  the dialogue in the form of  six ladies dressed in national clothes of  
the Central Asian nations and Japan. Such action by the Japanese side could be considered as a desire to give 
the dialogue attributes of  the “organization.”
(2) Unique trends in the dialogue’s activities
In 2015, the Foreign Ministry of  Japan commissioned a survey of  public opinion, which showed that 70 per 
cent of  respondents in the region highly appreciate the activities of  the dialogue. However, the core question–
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“Last year the “Central Asia Plus Japan” dialogue celebrated its tenth anniversary. Do you think the 
strengthening of  the ties between Japan and Central Asia brings beneﬁt via similar commemorative events?”–
actually does not reflect the essence of  the dialogue activities and apparently cannot be presented as an 
assessment of  its role. Based on this fact, the author suggested that the dialogue’s issue was excluded from the 
second opinion poll (after Abe’s visit to Central Asia) intentionally. However, there are some positive trends in 
the dialogue activities that could be attributed as the dialogue’s effect:
1. Since the fourth FMM, there has been an increase in the number of  FMMs’ outcome documents. Outcomes 
of  Mahmudov’s interview with Jun Nanazawa, former head of  Central Asia and the Caucasus division, shows 
that the dialogue has “revived” after the fourth ministerial meeting, from formal to practical character (2017).
2. The most popular form of  outcome documents is “Joint statements” and “Roadmaps.” In this regard, it 
can be concluded that the Action plan is still the main document of  the dialogue, and the Joint Statements and 
Roadmaps serve as complementary to the Action plan documents.
3. Transformation of  the dialogue’s role could also be traced in the titles of  outcome documents. At the ﬁrst 
FMM, there was a reference to the entrance into so-called “New Era” of  relations as a starting point of  the 
dialogue’s process. The fourth FMM was concluded with the establishment of  a “New Partnership,” which 
differs from such terms as “relations” and “cooperation” in other titles. In addition, outcome documents of  the 
ﬁfth and sixth FMMs give references to the beginning of  a new working timeframe of  the dialogue (2014–24) 
and strengthening of  the “multilateral” component in its activities.
4. The level of  outcome documents’ signatories indicates that the full-ﬂedged activities of  the dialogue with 
the participation of  all countries and ministers began only during the fourth FMM. Accordingly, the dialogue 
started its functions as a full-ﬂedged mechanism only after the fourth ministerial meeting.
5. The text analysis of  outcome documents shows a high level of  references to the role and efforts of  the 
Government of  Japan. At the same time, a relatively low number of  references to the individual countries of  
Central Asia could be found. In the texts, the term “Central Asia” is highly prevalent for the description of  the 
Central Asian republics. 
Moreover, the texts contain sufficient references to the importance of  Japan–Central Asia cooperation. 
However, as in the ﬁrst case, we can also trace serious differences in the allusion of  the dialogue and different 
IOs and ROs. In four of  six cases, references to separate IOs and ROs prevail over the use of  the dialogue.
6. Despite the strong beliefs about the dialogue as a tool of  geopolitical game, ﬁndings clearly show that the 
dialogue countries do not mention third parties, except for some cases. In this connection, the author believes 
(Note: IOs–International organizations; ROs–Regional organizations; P2P–people-to-people exchanges)
Figure 3. Agenda for the dialogue
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that there is also a consensus among nations on the discussion of  the policies of  third countries, for example, 
Russia or China. In 2012, Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Press Secretary Saiki Naoko confirmed for 
the ﬁrst time that the Dialogue is not aiming at any particular country. However, at that time, during severe 
diplomatic contradictions between China and Japan, she did not rule out whether the issues related to the PRC 
would be raised during the fourth FMM or not. Then-Foreign Minister Gemba also ignored such questions.
(3) Practical dimension
The detailed analysis of  dialogue-related documents allows the identiﬁcation of  a small number of  initiatives 
that could be attributed to the effect of  the Japanese initiative, indicated as follows:
1. According to Kawaguchi, despite her promise to accept one thousand trainees from Central Asia (first 
FMM), Japan received almost 1200 people at that time. Same time, Japan accepted 9,154 trainees between 
1991 and 2015. In addition, Foreign Minister Kishida also declared at the sixth FMM that Japan would provide 
additional training opportunities for approximately 2,000 people over the next ﬁve years.
2. In 2005, the JBIC surveyed the adjustment of  water resources and electricity, one of  the critical issues in the 
region, to examine possible forms of  cooperation with regional areas of  cooperation in Central Asia.
3. Based on the outcome of  the second FMM, the JICA published a paper titled “Study on Intra-Regional 
Cooperation over Water and Power for Efﬁcient Resources Management in Central Asia.” The main function of  
the report was to determine the role of  Japan in water and electricity-related issues in Central Asia:
“Japan leads in areas such as water saving, water resources management and energy saving, and can, 
therefore, provide Central Asian countries with its excellent technology. Technical assistance should be 
expanded to reform systems including improving the management of  power-related facilities such as 
power generation, transmission, and distribution. It is appropriate to start with projects which will be 
conducted within a country but…will have regional impacts rather than immediately venture gigantic 
projects.”
The report also included the following recommendations: (1) strengthening of  mutual trust through 
continuous dialogue; (2) support based on a long-term perspective; (3) respect to the individuality, assistance 
in accordance with the state of  progress; (4) prevention of  unfairness; (5) cooperation with other donors; (6) 
advantage use of  Japan’s expertise.
In particular, the Japanese support should be promoted based on fundamental principles, like “(give) priority 
to projects producing effect…for the entire region and all countries concerned.” At the same time, these 
recommendations include specific pre-conditions, namely, “a mutual agreement on the promotion of  intra-
regional cooperation through river basin management and electric power interchange.”
4. In order to implement the decisions of  the fifth FMM, in 2015 the JICA together with the Hokkaido 
Intellectual Tank and the Overseas Merchandise Inspection Co., Ltd. conducted a survey on the agricultural 
sectors of  Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The JICA also conducted point studies about the promotion of  Japanese 
technologies owned by private companies in Hokkaido, in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Uzbekistan). Moreover, based on the dialogue’s decisions, the JICA and the FAO have developed a program of  
cooperation in the ﬁeld of  locust control which focuses on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The project amount for 
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan totaled US$ 5 million.
5. Following the fifth FMM, the JICA together with several Japanese companies conducted a study on 
emergency preparedness in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Mongolia.
6. During the sixth FMM, Foreign Minister Kishida announced that visa applications between Japan and the 
Central Asian republics would be simpliﬁed, especially for people engaged in business, academic, or cultural 
exchanges.
7. On 22 February 2018, in Astana, the UNDP and the Embassy of  Japan signed an Exchange of  Note , 
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according to which the Japanese Government committed to provide US$ 6.1 million for the regional project 
titled, “Strengthening Community Resilience and Regional Cooperation for Prevention of  Violent Extremism 
in Central Asia.” According to Japanese ofﬁcials, this project is part of  Japan’s commitments under the sixth 
FMM.
8. On March 6, 2018 based on the sixth FMM discussions, the Government of  Japan provided US$ 6.2 million 
to Kyrgyzstan for the implementation of  two programs, “Strengthening the System of  Maternal and Child 
Health” (US$ 3.5 million) for the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and “Strengthening drug control measures” 
(US$ 2.7 million) for the UNODC.
9. At the fourth FMM, the Japanese officials announced that the government had already implemented 
several projects worth US$ 700 million to promote cooperation in the region. The exact list of  such projects was 
not ofﬁcially disclosed. In this regard, the author believes that this amount covered Japanese projects that were 
already implemented or were under implementation by the time of  the fourth FMM.
10. At the sixth FMM, Kishida came out with the “Initiative for Cooperation in Transport and Logistics,” 
which was used by the Japanese Government to undertake concrete projects involving cooperation in the ﬁeld of  
transportation. It was said that the initiative would include a signiﬁcant amount of  assistance, approximately 
24 billion yen. According to the document, monetary resources will be allocated to projects in such areas as 
border control (e.g., UNODC), air communication (e.g., airport modernization and personnel training), ground 
transportation, and logistics. These projects also include yen loans, grants, and technical assistance.
(4). External effects
It is worthwhile to note that the dialogue was launched in the same year as Japanese dialogue with the 
Visegrad group (V4). 
Moreover, similar platforms were created with GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic 
Development (2007), Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) (2013) and three former USSR Baltic states (2018). Actually, all 
these dialogue platforms are supervised in Japan by the European Affairs Bureau.
Tetsuji Tanaka mentioned that the dialogue gave impetus to similar platforms between Central Asia, the 
EU and the U.S. Moreover, Tanaka, the current head of  the Japanese Centre on Chinese studies, noted that the 
Chinese “16 +1” initiative has possible roots in the dialogue (see Figure 4). According to Tanaka, the thesis 
about the Japanese track in the EU-Central Asia and the C5+1 format was also recognized by the famous U.S. 
scholar Starr during their occasional meetings in Tokyo and Tashkent. The same thesis was indicated in an 
article about the tenth anniversary of  the dialogue in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s online magazine “Wakaru! 
Kokusai josei” (“I understand! The International Situation”), Vol. 117, on 11 July 2014. According to the article, 
Figure 4. The effect of  the dialogue.
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“This pioneering effort by Japan has attracted attention from the international community, and now the EU, 
Korea, etc. have also launched a dialogue forum with a similar approach.”
However, Tanaka is convinced that Japan’s participation in regional affairs will be less active if  the republics 
cannot become one-piece. Amb. Kawato shares a similar opinion. According to the former diplomat, the creation 
of  the dialogue can be viewed as Japan’s earliest attempt to develop its own “diplomatic card” in relations with 
Russia and China. Leaders in Japan will be able to achieve more of  their goals in the region only if  all Central 
Asian republics could form a single uniﬁed bloc.
5. Conclusion
As we can see, in the early 2000s Japan planned to create the “Japan-CACO” dialogue, which, based on 
previous aspirations of  the Japanese side in the framework of  ASEAN-Japan and ASEAN+3, was bound to 
transform in the “CACO+5” (e.g. Russia, China, Japan, the U.S. and the EU) mechanism. Despite the dilution of  
the CACO, Japan retained its interest in Central Asia and came forward with its own idea. The author realized 
that Japan had a choice–to create a dialogue or not. Again, the appointment of  Kawaguchi as Foreign Minister 
was accidental and possible only after the resignation of  her predecessor Makiko Tanaka as a result of  a major 
scandal in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, this initiative was developed and became an example 
of  a new type of  multilateral diplomatic framework for Japan, based on the afﬁliation of  partner countries to a 
particular region, rather than regional organization. 
Today, dialogue is an essential complement to the Japanese foreign policy, which allows it to compensate an 
insufﬁcient level of  interaction between Japan and Central Asia in the global arena. In this regard, dialogue can 
also serve as an essential argument for Japan in the discussion of  the Central Asian agenda with various actors.
Same time, the dialogue was able to achieve its goal, since the Central Asian countries were able to create 
similar structures with other key countries and regions, and today collectively defend their common interests. 
The author concluded that Japan, if  the current status quo is maintained, could fall under the inﬂuence of  the 
Central Asian republics, which, in turn, could try to reformat the dialogue and its content. In fact, Japan could 
become a “hostage” of  its own initiative, as many of  its early efforts have not been implemented.
However, the dialogue has essential features that allow Japan and Central Asia to discuss a wide range of  
issues in the framework of  FMMs, SOMs and TIDs. In this context, the dialogue participants demonstrate their 
aspirations for further changes through the great focus on the real-life meaning of  the dialogue. Moreover, 
academic interest in the dialogue might be enforced by recent political trends in Central Asia. The advent 
of  a new leader in Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, re-launched political discussions about the intraregional 
integration in Central Asia. For example, on November 10, 2017 President Mirziyoyev proposed to convene 
annual meetings of  the Central Asian leaders, whose ﬁrst informal meeting was hosted by President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of  Kazakhstan on March 15, 2018 in Astana.
It is no doubt that this process would be accompanied by a revision of  regional strategies of  the Central 
Asian nations in the framework of  different multilateral dialogue platforms, including with Japan. As a ﬁrst 
step, during their meeting on November 10, 2017 in Uzbekistan, Central Asian Foreign Ministers already agreed 
to cooperate on their joint actions in the framework of  ministerial meetings of  “EU–Central Asia,” “C5+1 
(U.S.),” “Central Asia–ROK” Cooperation Forum, the US–Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement, and the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialogue. 
In such situations, Japanese diplomats always love to say, “The ball’s in your court now.” However, today 
the ball is in the Japanese court. Indeed, the Central Asian countries have created a unique momentum that 
can help their foreign partners to demonstrate declared by them intentions and opportunities. If  the dialogue 
miss a chance for more radical transformation now, it is unlikely that it will be able to improve its work in the 
foreseeable future.
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